Using equity returns for financial institutions we estimate both catastrophic and operational risk measures over the period . We find evidence of cyclical components in both the catastrophic and operational risk measures obtained from the generalized Pareto distribution and the skewed generalized error distribution. Our new, comprehensive approach to measuring operational risk shows that approximately 18% of financial institutions' returns represent compensation for operational risk. However, depository institutions are exposed to operational risk levels that average 39% of the overall equity risk premium. Moreover, operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of large unexpected catastrophic losses, although when they occur, the losses are smaller than those resulting from a combination of market risk, credit risk or other risk events.
Introduction
A natural point of departure for all elements of business risk measurement is the past. Future trends and current metrics are often extrapolated from an historical data series. However, this process is fundamentally flawed if there are cyclical factors that impact business measures of risk or performance. Historical data on operational risk gathered during an economic expansion may not be relevant for a period of recession. Estimates of default risk and recovery rates incorporate cyclical components that are correlated to systematic risk factors, such as macroeconomic fluctuations and regulatory shifts. All too frequently, however, researchers and practitioners alike ignore these cyclical factors and blithely extend an unadjusted trend line into the future. The metrics obtained using this methodology are fundamentally flawed. By aggregating across different macroeconomic regimes, these historical estimates do not accurately reflect either time period. It is the goal of this paper to demonstrate the importance of developing models to adjust for systematic and cyclical risk factors in business metrics.
Neglect of cyclical components in business and risk measurement is not the result of an oversight. Indeed, currently one of the major impediments to the adoption of the BIS New Capital Accord for international bank regulations is the proposal's neglect of cyclical factors.
2 Concerns focus on the procyclical nature of credit risk. That is, if there are systemic cyclicalities in bank risk exposures, for example, then aggregate bank capital requirements that are based on risk measurements with significant cyclical components may experience cyclical swings that may have unintended, adverse impacts on the macroeconomy. For example, if credit risk models overstate (understate) default risk in bad (good) times, then internal bank capital requirements will be set too high (low) in bad (good) times, thereby forcing capital-constrained banks to retrench on lending during recessions and expand lending during booms. Since most banks are subject to the same cyclical fluctuations, the overall macroeconomic effect of capital regulations is to exacerbate business cycles, thereby worsening recessions and overheating expanding economies -that is, the riskadjusted capital requirements proposed by the BIS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are procyclical. 3 Academic and business researchers acknowledge the importance of cyclical factors in business measures of risk and performance. survey the state of the literature on adjusting risk measures for macroeconomic factors. Lowe (2002) suggests that a business cycle view would result in recessions following expansions and vice versa in a pattern similar to a sine wave. However, the poor track record of economic forecasting might cast doubts on such a simple specification of cyclical effects. Lowe (2002) acknowledges the difficulties in incorporating more complex cyclical models. Most risk measurement models, therefore, assume that key parameters are independent of macroeconomic factors.
This paper tests and rejects that hypothesis. We explicitly test whether cyclical risk factors are incorporated into measures of operational risk and catastrophic risk exposures in financial institutions. 4 We find that cyclical factors are significant components of both catastrophic and operational risk.
5 This is the first paper, to our knowledge, to test the cyclicality of operational risk exposures. To accomplish this, we devise a measure of operational risk that encompasses the low frequency, high severity operational loss events, as well as the high frequency, low severity day-to-day operational risk events.
The quantification of operational risk is, in itself, a contribution of our paper. Our new, comprehensive approach to measuring operational risk shows that approximately 18% of financial institutions' returns represent compensation for operational risk. This result is similar to the estimates obtained using different empirical methodologies by Kuritzkes (2002) and de Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) . However, our results suggest that depository institutions are exposed to operational risk levels that average 39% of the overall equity risk premium. We find that the proportion of overall risk exposure that can be attributed to operational risk varies over time and is, at times, quite large. Moreover, operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of large unexpected catastrophic losses, although when they occur, the losses are smaller, on average, than those resulting from a combination of market risk, credit risk or other risk events. Our results hold when catastrophic risk and operational risk are estimated using two different methodologies: the extreme value theory implemented using the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) of Pickands (1975) , and a skewed fat-tailed distribution implemented using the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) of Bali and Theodossiou (forthcoming) . Our results are also robust to alternative distributions, as well as to a simulated database.
As of June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has adopted a narrow definition of operational risk for regulatory purposes that focuses on day-to-day loss events emanating from computer failures and human error, for example, while excluding catastrophic operational risk events resulting from reputational losses and strategic business errors. Although this definitional decision may be warranted on pragmatic grounds (i.e., the absence of reliable industry databases on extreme tail operational loss events), the eventual goal is to develop a more comprehensive measure of operational risk that is more consistent with the designation of regulatory capital as a cushion against unexpected loss. 6 In this paper, we offer a first step toward this ultimate goal. Our ''top-down'' model can be used to calibrate ''bottom-up'' operational risk models for the purposes of 4 If investors can diversify their portfolio holdings, the question may be posed as to why catastrophic risk is at all relevant. One reason may be that catastrophic risk events are highly visible, even to relatively uninformed traders. Merton (1987) and Shapiro (2002) show that portfolio holdings of informationally constrained investors may be impacted by visibility, such that investors may eschew holdings of stocks of firms with negative visibility (e.g., resulting from catastrophic risk events). In addition, in this paper, we consider financial institutions such as banks that have access to a government-subsidized safety net. In exchange for these government subsidies, regulators require banks to maintain capital positions designed to protect the overall safety and soundness of the banking system. Catastrophic risk events may potentially cause contagion and systemic risk problems that undermine this regulatory policy goal. Therefore, value at risk measures that focus on the lower tails of the return distribution are important determinants of bank capital requirements. 5 There are many implications of our finding cyclicality in risk measures. For example, if risk measures contain systematic components, then the current approach to levying bank capital requirements may engender unintended macroeconomic consequences. Currently, individual bank capital requirements are simply aggregated, under the assumption that they are independent of each other. Our results cast doubt on the accuracy of that assumption. 6 Kashyap and Stein (2004) discuss the design of socially optimal capital regulations.
both regulatory and economic capital determination. 7 By relying on equity returns to measure operational risk, we measure the impact of operational loss events on overall firm value. Many of the bottom-up models that measure operational risk from a cost perspective can obtain spurious results. For example, if a firm institutes operational risk managerial controls, costs will generally increase thereby leading the bottom-up model to generate estimates of increased risk, but, if the managerial controls are effective, operational risk should actually decrease. Moreover, bottom-up models often suffer from over-disaggregation in that they break down production processes into individual steps that may obscure the broader picture. Finally, bottom-up models rely on subjective data provided by employees that are under scrutiny and therefore have little incentive to be forthcoming. 8 Thus, a top-down model, such as presented in this paper, that uses an objective data source (e.g., equity returns) should be a useful complement to the bottom-up operational risk models currently under development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the database. Sections 2 and 3 provide the properties and estimation procedures of the GPD and SGED distributions, respectively. Section 4 shows alternative VaR models based on the GPD and SGED density. Section 5 determines the presence and significance of cyclical factors in catastrophic risk measures. Section 6 defines a new, residual measure of operational risk that is quite comprehensive. Section 7 tests for the presence and significance of cyclicality in our new operational risk measures. Section 8 runs a battery of robustness checks based on conditional VaR measures and alternative distributions. Section 9 concludes.
Database
We analyze catastrophic risk using a sample comprised of financial intermediaries. We limit our study of catastrophic risk to financial institutions in order to define a relatively homogenous group of firms that have broad risk exposures. 9 Financial intermediaries maintain risk inventories as a normal course of conducting business -making markets, underwriting securities and holding portfolios comprised of financial securities. Thus, we believe that a sample of financial institutions offers the best opportunity to observe a wide range of risk exposures, thereby making it possible to decompose catastrophic risk into its components. 7 Top-down models of operational risk calculate the overall cost to the firm of operational loss events, whereas bottom-up models analyze the risk factors and costs inherent in the individual steps of a production process. note that whereas bottom-up models may be appropriate for the purposes of risk diagnostics and design of internal managerial controls, top-down models may be effective in estimating economic capital requirements. Currie (2004) calls for the concurrent use of both top-down and bottom-up models in order to estimate operational risk capital requirements. 8 It is unlikely that employees will volunteer information about operational risk events resulting from human errors and inadequate behavior. This is indicated by the BIS loss data collection exercise operational risk database that contains only 3.3% of the total loss events reported in the ''internal fraud'' category. See Kalhoff and Haas (2004) and Haas and Kaiser (2004) for a discussion of the insufficiency of loss data for the quantification of operational risk. 9 Our approach is to measure overall risk by focusing on extreme tail loss events. This avoids the classification error associated with specifying risk as distinctly emanating from either credit losses, interest rate fluctuations or other market fluctuations, thereby avoiding the problem of correlated risks that are difficult to disentangle. For example, is a drought in the Midwest that causes defaults on agricultural loans an example of operational risk or credit risk? We avoid this conundrum by considering extreme losses to be catastrophic risk.
Although financial intermediaries have similar characteristics, they are not completely homogenous. For example, banks differ somewhat from insurance companies and from broker/dealers. 10 We construct our sample by searching CRSP for all firms traded on either the NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq that had primary SIC codes of 6XXX over the time period from April 1973 to June 2003. 11 We obtain monthly data (including dividends) from CRSP, resulting in a total of 209,627 observations of monthly equity returns. 12, 13 We define the catastrophic risk tail of the monthly return distribution to be those returns in the lowest 10% of each of the monthly cross-sections of observations. In Section 2, we perform our analysis on those lower tail observations only, thereby limiting our analysis to 20,978 observations. In Section 3, we estimate the entire distribution for financial institutions' monthly equity returns.
The effect of diversification in risk reduction is quite apparent in comparisons of the distribution of SIC codes in the lower tail of the return distribution to the entire distribution comprised of all monthly equity returns on financial institutions. Holding companies (SIC code 67, which includes bank holding companies and mutual funds) represent 48% of the entire sample, but only 39% of the observations in the lower return tail of equity returns. Moreover, depository institutions (SIC code 60) have relatively less downside risk exposure than other financial institutions (comprising 20% of the lower tail observations, but 25% of the entire database), perhaps as a result of constraining banking regulations, such as minimum capital requirements, as well as access to the governmental safety net in the form of deposit insurance and lender of last resort privileges. In contrast, non-depository credit institutions (SIC code 61) were more heavily represented in the lower tail of equity returns (comprising 9% of the observations) than in the entire sample (comprising 5% of the observations). This may reflect the periodic upheavals in the mortgage banking business in the US. Other classifications that experienced relatively greater amounts of downside risk over the sample period were real estate firms (SIC code 65, comprising 9% of the tail observations, but only 5% of the entire sample), security and commodity brokers (SIC code 62, comprising 6% of the tail observations, but only 3% of the entire sample) and 10 These lines of distinction have become somewhat blurred by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which permits consolidation of banking, insurance and securities activities into a single financial holding company. In our empirical analysis, we present results for all financial institutions and also distinguish different types of financial intermediaries by their regulatory and market structure environments. 11 Although we obtain 560,038 monthly returns from CRSP over the period January 1973-December 2003, an inadequate number of observations available in the COMPUSTAT database reduced our sample period from April 1973 to June 2003. The final number of observations in our database is reduced to 209,627, predominately because of missing values for assets, net income, sales, as well as the lack of 50 months of continuous monthly returns, all required for the estimation of operational risk in Section 6. However, we have also estimated catastrophic risk distributions using the entire sample of observations over the period of 1973-2001, with similar results (available from the authors upon request) to those presented in this paper. We use a monthly sampling frequency because of the unavailability of most macroeconomic data at shorter frequency intervals. 12 To check for the possibility of window dressing of quarter-end and year-end data, as found in Allen and Saunders (1992) , we constructed our own monthly returns using mid-month to mid-month equity prices. Our results were quite similar to those obtained from the CRSP monthly returns; therefore, we do not report them here. 13 We measure VaR using equity returns, rather than unobserved asset values. KMV option-theoretic models utilize leverage adjusted equity volatility in order to derive asset volatility following Ronn and Verma (1986) ; see chapter 4 of Allen and Saunders (2002) . We incorporate leverage as a control variable in our cyclicality and operational risk regressions. insurance companies (SIC code 63, comprising 14% of the tail observations, but only 12% of the entire sample).
Estimating catastrophic risk using the generalized Pareto distribution
Catastrophic risk may be generated by extreme shifts in interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices, commodity prices, credit quality or operational performance. Thus, catastrophic risk contains elements of market risk, credit risk and operational risk. In this section and in Section 3, we focus on catastrophic risk, whatever its source. Subsequently, in Section 6, we decompose catastrophic risk into its market risk, credit risk and operational risk components and analyze the cyclical effects in the operational risk (residual) component.
Generalized Pareto distribution (GPD)
Extremes are generally defined as excesses over a high or low threshold, and can be modeled by the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) of Pickands (1975) . This paper concentrates on the lower (left) tail of the return distribution, and obtains the extremes from the cross-section of stock returns for each month from April 1973 to June 2003. More specifically, extreme returns are measured by the 10% left tail of the empirical distribution of stock returns r. Campbell et al. (2001) , Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) , and Bali et al. (2005) measure average stock risk and average idiosyncratic risk in each month as the cross-sectional equal-weighted or value-weighted average of the variances of all the stocks traded in that month. Similarly, we use the cross-section of stock returns and estimate value at risk for each month from April 1973 to June 2003 in order to identify extreme tail risk events that may never occur in the life cycle of an individual firm. This methodology would be problematic if each financial institution held the same portfolio and this portfolio had a stationary return distribution. However, this is not case because portfolio composition differs across individual financial institutions. Moreover, we find that the return distributions exhibit time-varying behavior. 14 Let us call f(r) the probability density function (p.d.f.) and F(r) the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of r, which can take values between l and u.
15 First, we choose a low threshold l so that all r i < l < 0 are defined to be in the negative tail of the distribution, where r 1 , r 2 , . . ., r n are a sequence of stock returns. Then we denote the number of exceedances of l (or stock returns lower than l) by
14 In addition to using the cross-section of equity returns in calculating unconditional VaR measures, at an earlier stage of the study, we use within-month daily returns to estimate the non-parametric VaR measures for each financial firm and then generate the equal-weighted and value-weighted average VaR of the whole banking industry. Alternatively, we use the past 24-60 monthly returns (as available) from the empirical distribution to compute VaR for each financial firm and then calculate the equal-weighted and value-weighted average VaR of the whole banking industry. Since the results from these alternative measures of ''aggregate VaR'' turn out to be similar to those reported in our tables, we do not present them in the paper. They are available upon request. 15 For example, a random variable distributed as the normal gives l = À1 and u = +1. and the corresponding excesses by M 1 ; M 2 ; . . . ; M N l . The excess distribution function of r is given by F l ðyÞ ¼ P ðr À l P yjr < lÞ ¼ P ðM P yjr < lÞ; y 6 0: ð2Þ Using the threshold l, we now define the probabilities associated with r: P ðr 6 lÞ ¼ F ðlÞ; ð3Þ
where y < 0 is an exceedence of the threshold l. Finally, let F l (y) be given by
We thus obtain the F l (y), the conditional distribution of how extreme a r i is, given that it already qualifies as an extreme. Pickands (1975) shows that F l (y) will be very close to the generalized Pareto distribution G min,n in Eq. (6) if l is a low threshold:
where l, r, and n are the location, scale, and shape parameters of the GPD, respectively. The shape parameter n, called the tail index, reflects the fatness of the distribution (i.e., the weight of the tails), whereas the parameters of scale r and of location l represent the dispersion and average of the extremes, respectively.
16
Two parametric approaches are commonly used to estimate the extreme value distributions: (1) the maximum likelihood method which yields parameter estimators which are unbiased, asymptotically normal, and of minimum variance, and (2) the regression method which provides a graphical method for determining the type of asymptotic distribution.
17
In this paper the maximum likelihood method is used to estimate catastrophic and operational risk parameters.
Suppose that the generalized extreme value distribution for the minima, G min (U; x), has a density function g min (U; x), where U ¼ ðn; l; rÞ 2 R Â R Â R þ consists of a shape parameter n, a location parameter l and a scale parameter r. Then the likelihood function based on the data for the minimum variable
Denote the log-likelihood function by l(U; M T ) = lnL(U; M T ). The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for U then equals
. . . ; M T Þ maximizes l(U; M T ) over an appropriate parameter space H. 16 The generalized Pareto distribution presented in Eq. (6) nests the Pareto distribution, the uniform distribution, and the exponential distribution. The shape parameter, n, determines the tail behavior of the distributions. For n > 0, the distribution has a polynomially decreasing tail (Pareto). For n = 0, the tail decreases exponentially (exponential). For n < 0, the distribution is short tailed (uniform). 17 Details and presentation of alternative statistical estimation methods can be found in Leadbetter et al. (1983) , Resnick (1987) , Embrechts et al. (1997) , Longin (1996) , and Bali (2003) . A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date scale parameter The generalized Pareto distribution presented in (6) has a density function for the minima
which yields the log-likelihood function
Differentiating the log-likelihood function in (10) with respect to l, r, and n yields the firstorder conditions of the maximization problem. Clearly, no explicit solution exists to these non-linear equations, and thus numerical procedures or search algorithms are required.
Figs. 1A-C, respectively, present the location, scale, and shape parameter estimates (denoted l-GPD, r-GPD and n-GPD, respectively) obtained for our sample of financial institutions. For example, Fig. 1A A p r -7 3 A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date shape parameter Fig. 1 (continued) Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) which lifted interest rate ceilings, increased deposit insurance coverage to $100,000, allowed banks to offer savings accounts paying market interest rates, expanded lending powers for thrift institutions, and set uniform reserve requirements for state and nationally chartered banks. Both the introduction of risk management through options trading on organized exchanges and the DIDMCA were heralded as revolutionary improvements in the economic and regulatory environment governing financial intermediation. On the other hand, the scale parameter was maximized (at 0.28) for the month of December 1990. This coincided with the passage of the Basel capital accords, the first risk-adjusted international bank capital requirements. Finally, Fig. 1C plots the monthly tail-thickness parameter, which shows that catastrophic risk is characterized by fat tails since the estimated shape parameters are positive for most months.
Estimating catastrophic risk using the skewed generalized error distribution
In Section 2, we focus on the lower tail of the return distribution. That is, we define catastrophic risk based on the lowest 10% of all monthly equity returns for financial institutions during any month over the period from April 1973 to June 2003. In this section, we investigate the shape of the entire return distribution. Thus, the results here place catastrophic risk into the context of the entire probability distribution of monthly cross-sectional equity returns for financial intermediaries.
In order to depict the range of all observed monthly equity returns, we must make some assumptions about the presumed shape of the equity return distribution. We start with the simplest and most restrictive assumption -normality. Then we proceed to a general distribution, the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED), thereby permitting the estimation of four distributional moments -mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. We submit these distributional assumptions to statistical tests (likelihood ratio test) of the null hypothesis (normality) against the SGED assumption. Monthly likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the normality assumption at the 1% significance level for almost all months from April 1973 to June 2003 3.1. Skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) Subbotin (1923) introduces the Generalized Error Distribution (GED) as special cases of Laplace, normal, and uniform distributions. The symmetric GED density is given by Eq. (11):
where r t is the return at time t, g t ¼ rtÀl r is the standardized return at time t, CðaÞ ¼ R þ1
Cð3=vÞ h i 1=2 , and v > 0 is the degrees of free-dom or tail-thickness parameter. For v = 2, the GED yields the normal distribution, while for v = 1 it yields the Laplace or the double exponential distribution. If v < 2, the density has thicker tails than the normal, whereas for v > 2 it has thinner tails. The GED is used by Box and Tiao (1962) to model prior densities in Bayesian estimation, Nelson (1991) to model the distribution of stock market returns, and Hsieh (1989) to model the distribution of exchange rates. Bali and Theodossiou (forthcoming) introduce an asymmetric (or skewed) version of the GED. The skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) adds an additional moment, skewness, to the GED formulation. The probability density function for the SGED is
where
, l and r are the mean and standard deviation of returns r t , k is a skewness parameter, sign is the sign function, and C(AE) is the gamma function. The scaling parameters k and k obey the following constraints k > 0 and À1 < k < 1. The parameter k controls the height and tails of the density function and the skewness parameter k controls the rate of descent of the density around the mode of r, where mode(r) = l À dr. In the case of positive skewness (k > 0), the density function is skewed to the right. This is because for values of r < l À dr, the return variable r is weighted by a greater value than unity and for values of r > l À dr by a value less than unity. The opposite is true for negative k. Note that k and d have the same sign, thus, in case of positive skewness (k > 0), the mode(r) is less than the expected value of r. The parameter d is Pearson's skewness [l -mode(r)]/r = d.
The SGED distribution reduces to the GED for k = 0, the Laplace distribution for k = 0 and k = 1, the normal distribution for k = 0 and k = 2, and the uniform distribution for k = 0 and k = 1.
The SGED parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function of r t with respect to the parameters l, r, k, and k:
where C, h, and d are defined below Eq. (12), sign is the sign of the residuals (r t À l + dr), and n is the sample size. We estimate the entire return distribution under the two alternative assumptions -the normal and the SGED -but the empirical results are presented only for SGED density to preserve space. Fig. 2 presents the monthly parameter estimates for the SGED consisting of four moments (mean plotted in Fig. 2A , standard deviation in Fig. 2B , skewness in Fig. 2C and kurtosis in Fig. 2D ). We find a similar pattern of volatility in the moments of the SGED as shown in Fig. 1 for the GPD. A notable point in Fig. 2A -D is that there is more variation in the standard deviation and tail-thickness parameters (r and k) as compared to the mean and skewness parameters of SGED (l and k). We also find that the time-series of r and k are more persistent than l and k, implying more significant serial A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date standard deviation parameter A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date tail-thickness parameter Fig. 2 (continued) 4. Catastrophic value at risk (VaR) estimates using the GPD and SGED
The traditional VaR models assume that the probability distribution of log-price changes (log-returns) is normal. However, our results reject that hypothesis. Thus, we must use alternative VaR models based on the GPD and SGED parameters.
In continuous time diffusion models, (log)-stock price movements are described by the following stochastic differential equation:
where P t is the price level at time t, W t is a standard Wiener process with zero mean and variance of dt, l and r are the drift and diffusion parameters. In discrete time, Eq. (14) yields a return process
where Dt is the length of time interval in which the discrete time data are recorded and
is the Wiener process with zero mean and variance of Dt. The critical step in calculating VaR is the estimation of the threshold point defining what variation in returns r t is considered to be extreme. Let a be the probability that r t is less than the threshold #. That is
where Pr(AE) is the underlying probability distribution. In the traditional VaR model, a = 1%, a = À2.326,
The risk manager, who has exposure to a risk factor r t , needs to know how much capital to put aside to cover at least the fraction 1 À a of daily losses during a year. For this purpose, the risk manager must first determine a threshold # so that the event (r t < #) has a probability a under Pr(AE). 19 The standard approach does this by using an explicit distribution that is generally assumed to be the normal distribution. An alternative approach is to use a cumulative probability distribution F(#) based on one of the extreme value and flexible probability distributions, and then solve for # to obtain the threshold, i.e.,
As shown in Bali (2003) , the GPD distribution yields the following VaR threshold 20 :
where n and N are the number of extremes and the number of total data points, respectively. Once the location (l), scale (r), and shape (n) parameters of the GPD distribution are estimated one can find the VaR threshold, # GPD , based on the choice of confidence level (a).
19 Basak and Shapiro (2001) show that VaR-based risk management may induce managers to incur larger losses, while still complying with a VaR constraint, by insuring against intermediate-loss states and incurring large losses in the worst states of the world. 20 For alternative extreme value approaches to estimating VaR, see Longin (2000) and McNeil and Frey (2000) .
There is substantial empirical evidence that the distribution of stock returns shows high peaks, fat tails and more outliers on the left tail. To account for skewness and kurtosis in the data, we use the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) that takes into account the non-normality of returns and relatively infrequent events. As shown in Bali and Theodossiou (forthcoming), an alternative approach to calculating VaR is based on the lower tail of the SGED distribution. Specifically, we estimate the parameters of the SGED density (l, r, k, k) using monthly returns and then find a specific percentile of the estimated distribution. Assuming that r t $ f k,k (z) follows an SGED density, parametric VaR is the solution to
where # SGED (a) is the VaR threshold based on the SGED density with a loss probability of a. Eq. (20) indicates that value at risk can be calculated by integrating the area under the probability density function of the SGED distribution. Eq. (20) can also be viewed as
, where l and r are the mean and standard deviation parameters of the SGED density and a, which depends on the higher moments (e.g., skewness and kurtosis) of the SGED, is the cut-off for the standardized cdf associated with probability 1 À a, i.e., F(a) = 1 À a.
Using Eqs. (19) and (20), we estimate the monthly value at risk (VaR) at the 99% confidence intervals (1% VaR) for the GPD and SGED parameters. 
Measuring the significance of cyclical factors in catastrophic risk measures
To test for cyclicality in the catastrophic risk measures defined in Section 4, we gathered monthly data on macroeconomic, systemic risk, and regulatory factors from a wide variety of data sources. 22 The variables can be broadly classified into seven categories: macroeconomic (including GDP, unemployment statistics, the University of Michigan survey on consumer sentiment, business bankruptcies, industrial production and NBER-marked recessions), foreign exchange rates (for the major currencies -the Japanese yen, the German mark and the British pound sterling in terms of US dollars), 23 equity market indices 21 Comparisons using the 0.5%, 2.5%, and 5% VaR yield similar results to those shown in Fig. 3 . 22 We measure the impact of economic and financial factors directly on monthly risk profiles. In contrast, there is a literature that incorporates systemic risk considerations by altering the variance-covariance matrix underlying returns. However, this may jeopardize the properties (e.g., invertibility) of the historical variance covariance matrix. See Kyle and Xiong (2001) , Longin and Solnik (2001) , Kodres and Pritsker (2002) , and Rigobon and Forbes (2002) . 23 The monthly time series observations of DM/US are not available after January 1999 because of the adoption of the Euro. We incorporate the Euro/US dollar exchange rate into the DM/US dollar exchange rate series after January 1999. A p r -7 3 A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date A p r -7 3 A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date Difference in 1% Catastrophic VaR Estimates (for Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US), consumer price indices (for Japan, Germany, the UK and the US), interest rates (for long and short government bonds, Aaa-rated corporate bonds and Baa-rated corporate bonds), money supply figures (M2 for Japan, Germany, the EU, the UK and the US), and regulatory dummy variables (for the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act in March 1980, the FDIC Improvement Act in December 1991, the first Basel Capital Accord in December 1992, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in September 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in November 1999).
24 Panels A and B of Table 1 provide the source of data and the descriptive statistics for each of the 43 macroeconomic, cyclical and regulatory factors.
Modeling cyclical components in the catastrophic risk measures
We utilize the results from Sections 2 and 3 to test for cyclicality in our catastrophic risk measures. That is, in Section 2 we estimate catastrophic risk using the extreme value theory with the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) for the lowest 10% of equity returns for financial institutions in each month of our sample period . That analysis generates three catastrophic risk estimates: the location parameter (the mean of the extremes), the scale parameter (related to the standard deviation of the extremes) and the shape or tail index parameter (measuring tail-thickness of the GPD). Hereinafter we denote these three monthly parameters respectively as l-GPD, r-GPD, and n-GPD.
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In Section 3, we estimate the entire return distribution using the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED), after rejecting the hypothesis of normality for almost all months in our sample. The SGED estimation generates four monthly parameter measures: mean, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness, hereinafter denoted l-SGED, r-SGED, n-SGED, and k-SGED, respectively. Using the derivations based on the GPD and SGED parameters, we define the catastrophic value at risk (VaR) at the 1% level as VaR1%-GPD and VaR1%-SGED, respectively. 26 24 Although many other regulatory regime shifts occurred over the period 1973-2003, these five were viewed to be the most significant in terms of their impact on catastrophic risk in the financial services industry. The DIDMCA removed interest rate ceilings on deposits, authorized interest-bearing checking accounts (NOW and MMDA accounts), introduced uniform reserve requirements, increased deposit insurance coverage and expanded thrift powers. The FDICIA introduced prompt corrective action to require regulators to intervene when bank capital falls below certain thresholds, phased in risk-based deposit insurance premiums, limited ''too big to fail'' bailouts and forbearance by regulators, and extended federal regulation over foreign banks. The Basel Capital Accord created an internationally level playing field of capital requirements that were risk-adjusted and that included a capital charge for off-balance sheet activities. The Interstate Banking Act permitted bank holding companies to expand across state lines. The GLBA removed the Glass-Steagall Act restrictions on consolidation of banking, insurance and securities activities into a single holding company, thereby creating the financial holding company structure. 25 Bali and Neftci (2003) indicate that the mean of the GPD can be measured by the estimated l-GPD location parameter. They also show that the kurtosis of the extremes is largely determined by the estimated n-GPD and the standard deviation is a function of both the r-GPD and the n-GPD parameters. 26 For ease of exposition, all VaR measures are multiplied by À1 before running our regressions and computing correlations, even though the original VaR values are negative since they are obtained from the left tail of the return distribution. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the macroeconomic variables and the four parameters from the GPD estimation (l-GPD, r-GPD, n-GPD, and VaR1%-GPD), and Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients for the five risk parameters estimated using the SGED (l-SGED, r-SGED, n-SGED, k-SGED, and VaR1%-SGED). In both tables, we find evidence consistent with significant levels of cyclicality in catastrophic risk. Comparing Tables 2 and 3 shows that the relationships between both measures of 1% VaR and the macroeconomic variables are quite similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, the positive (significant at the 1% level) correlation coefficients on the index of industrial production (IndustryIndex variable) of 0.23 for VaR1%-GPD in Table 2 and 0.19 VaR1%-SGED in Table 3 suggest that catastrophic risk increases in recessions. Since the industrial production index is a leading indicator, peaks in the index indicate turning points in the business cycle. Thus, the positive coefficients on the industrial production index variable for the VaR regressions are consistent with evidence of forward-looking Table 1 . The catastrophic risk parameter estimates of the GPD are the location (l-GPD), scale (r-GPD), and tail thickness (n-GPD) parameters and VaR1%-GPD is the 1% catastrophic value at risk. p-values are given in parentheses.
procyclicality in catastrophic VaR, such that downturns in the economy coincide with high levels of the index of industrial production, thereby signaling an increase in value at risk. A Table 2 (Table 3) for VaR1%-GPD (VaR1%-SGED), both significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the positive and significant (at the 1% level) correlations between catastrophic VaR (both VaR1%-GPD and VaR1%-SGED) and all country stock market indices (for Canada, FPS6CA; for France, FPS6FR; for Germany, FPS6WG; for Italy, FPS6IT; for Japan, FPS6JP; for the UK, FPS6UK; and for the US, SPINDX), further suggests forward-looking procyclicality in catastrophic risk as the value at risk increases during stock market booms. The procyclical nature of banking activity is further demonstrated by the positive and significant (at the 1% level) correlation coefficients on the RsvAsset variable for both VaR1%-GPD (0.46 in Table 2 ) and VaR1%-SGED (0.35 in Table 3 ), suggesting that value at risk increases when bank reserves increase. Thus, banks retrench on their lending activity when risk levels increase, thereby exacerbating economic downturns. The correlation coefficients presented in Tables 2 and 3 indicate a significant (at the 1% level) negative relationship between catastrophic VaR and the Euro/US and yen/US exchange rates. Moreover, all country price index variables (for Japan, CPI_JP; for the UK, CPI_UK; for the US, CPI_US; and for Germany, CPI_G) display a positive and significant (at the 1% level) correlation with both estimates of catastrophic VaR. Declines in interest rates (both short term and long term, and across countries) correspond to increases in catastrophic value at risk, as reflected in the negative correlation coefficients shown in Tables 2 and 3 for these variables.
The procyclicality found in the catastrophic VaR is also evidenced in the distributional risk parameters. For example, the positive and significant (at the 5% level or better) correlation coefficients on the mean variables (0.12 for l-GPD in Table 2 and 0.16 for l-SGED in Table 3 ) for the US unemployment variable suggest a negative (leftward) shift in the return distribution when decreased unemployment levels signal the end of an economic upturn, consistent with the forward-looking procyclicality shown for catastrophic value at risk.
The regulatory environment also plays a role in determining the financial firms' catastrophic risk exposures. For example, passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 are all consistent with a significant (at the 5% level or better) increase in 1% VaR measured using both the GPD and the SGED approaches, demonstrating the risk inducing (i.e., VaR increasing) impact of regulatory policy changes.
Measuring operational risk
Before we estimate operational risk, we must first define it; something easier said than done. The definitions range from the very narrow (regulatory approach) to extremely broad classifications. For example, Kingsley et al. (1998, p. 3) define operational risk to be the ''risk of loss caused by failures in operational processes or the systems that support them, including those adversely affecting reputation, legal enforcement of contracts and claims.'' Often this definition includes both strategic risk and business risk. That is, operational risk arises from breakdowns of people, processes and systems (usually, but not limited to technology) within the organization. Strategic and business risk originate outside of the firm and emanate from external causes such as political upheavals, changes in regulatory or government policy, tax regime changes, mergers and acquisitions, and changes in market conditions. However, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision excludes strategic and business risk from the definition proposed in the New Capital Accord adopted in June 2004. 28 That is, BIS (September 2001) defines operational risk to be ''the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.'' Explicitly excluded from this definition are systemic risk, strategic and reputational risks, as well as all indirect losses or opportunity costs, which may be open-ended and huge in size compared to direct losses.
We utilize the more expansive definition of operational risk. Indeed, we define operational risk as a residual measure. After all the identifiable sources of risk (credit risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, equity price risk, etc.) are accounted for, the remainder is defined as operational risk. This sidesteps the difficult problem of modeling business activities on a micro level.
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A comprehensive measure of operational risk is appropriate for the purposes of computation of economic capital requirements. Operational risk events can be divided into high frequency/low severity (HFLS) events that occur regularly, in which each event individually exposes the firm to low levels of losses. In contrast, low frequency/high severity (LFHS) operational risk events are quite rare, but the losses to the organization are enormous upon occurrence. An operational risk measurement model must incorporate both HFLS and LFHS risk events. However, HFLS operational risk events are priced and can be insured, either through purchase of external insurance policies or through selfinsurance. Thus, it is the LFHS operational risk events that are the focus of both economic and regulatory capital. Because of moral hazard considerations, these extreme risk events are generally uninsurable externally. Moreover, they cannot be self-insured because a single LFHS operational risk event is typically sufficient to force the financial institution into insolvency. Thus, the narrow Basel definition of operational risk that limits attention to HFLS events is inconsistent with the function of capital as the cushion against extreme tail risk events. Moreover, operational loss databases tend to suffer from an under-representation of LFHS risk events. Haas and Kaiser (2004) note that LFHS events are, by definition, much less likely to occur, are often kept confidential and therefore are unreported, and may be misclassified as credit or market risk losses, thereby biasing estimates of VaR obtained using operational loss databases. 30 Furthermore, databases generated through data-sharing agreements across firms (as in the BIS loss data collection exercise and the proprietary Operational Riskdata eXchange) must also be scaled to fit the size and busi- 28 In October 2003, the SEC adopted a definition of operational risk for investment banks and broker-dealers that is even narrower than the Basel II definition in that it omits legal risk. See Currie (2004) . 29 Ebnother et al. (2003) perform a case study that expends considerable resources to model 103 production processes, but can only explain a small portion of the firm's VaR, despite the high cost of defining and maintaining data about the operational processes. Chernobai and Rachev (2004) use a proporietary loss database obtained from a European bank and find evidence of both fat tails and skewness in a bottom-up model of operational risk, consistent with our findings using equity returns in a top-down approach. 30 Another bias inherent in operational loss databases stems from the minimum loss requirement for inclusion in the database. See Haas and Kaiser (2004) and Kalhoff and Haas (2004) for a discussion of how truncated databases yield biased VaR estimates. ness mix of different companies for the data to be applicable to estimation of operational risk for a given firm. However, this is very difficult to accomplish given the poor quality of operational loss databases.
To avoid these data problems, we estimate the more comprehensive, residual operational risk measure for each financial institution using a monthly time series of equity returns over the period for all firms in our sample with at least 50 consecutive monthly equity returns. 31 For each of these firms, we estimated the following OLS regression 32 :
where r t and r tÀ1 are the monthly current and lagged equity returns on each of the financial firms in our sample over the period t = April 1973-June 2003; Dx it (i = 1,2,. . . , 22) is the first order difference of the 22 variables used to estimate credit risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and market risk; 33 FF it represents the three Fama-French (1993) factors (overall excess return on the market, SMB, and HML) and the momentum factor (UMD); 34 and three alternative industry return factors, R it , representing the average monthly return for each industry sector: depository institutions, insurance companies and securities firms. The equity returns on each of the three industry sectors are determined by dividing the sample of financial firms into three groups: depository institutions (SIC codes 60XX, 66XX and 6712), insurance companies (SIC codes 63XX and 64XX) and securities firms (all other 6XXX-level SIC codes). The 22 Dx it variables are taken from the macro variables defined in Table 1 and are grouped by risk source as follows 35 :
Overall credit risk measure: R AAA À R BBB = the spread between the AAA and the BBB corporate bond yield.
Firm-specific credit risk measures:
Market value of equity/book value of assets = 1 À leverage ratio. Net income/sales. Log of book value of total assets.
Interest rate risk measures: R_3MTB = 3 month US Treasury bill rates. R_10YTB = 10 year US Treasury bond rates. RM1B3S_a_UZ = 3 month Euribor rates.
31 There were 38 firms with only 50 monthly observations. The average number of months for any individual financial firm in our sample was 131. The maximum number was 363 months over the entire sample period of April 1973 -June 2003 This model is the reduced form of a lagged regression model with an assumed one month lag. 33 Each variable has 363 monthly observations over the sample period. 34 SMB measures the monthly performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (small minus big), HML measures the monthly equity returns on a portfolio of value stocks relative to growth stocks (high book-tomarket minus low book-to-market) and UMD is the momentum factor, measured as the average return on the two highest prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two lowest prior return portfolios. The residual term, e t , from Eq. (21), is the measure of operational risk used in this analysis. The coefficients on the Dx it terms (a i,t , b i,t , c i,t , p i,t ) are estimated as time-varying risk measures after the first 50 continuous months of observations. We utilize a rolling window of 50 months in order to estimate the monthly coefficient for each of the 22 risk measures. For example, suppose that a firm has 100 continuous monthly observations. We use the first 50 monthly returns to estimate the residual term in Eq. (21). Then, we replace the data of the first month with the data of the 51st month, and re-estimate the coefficients from Eq. (21). After that, we calculate the residual term for the 51st month by plugging the re-estimated coefficient estimates into Eq. (21). Following the same approach, we keep updating the coefficient estimates and residuals from the 52nd month to the 100th month. 37, 38 We then use the monthly residual operational risk measures derived from Eq. (21) to re-estimate the tails of the loss distribution. 36 After January 1999, the DM/US dollar exchange rate was replaced by the Euro/US dollar exchange rate by calculating an imputed DM/US dollar exchange rate as follows: (DM/Euro as of December 1998) · (Euro/US$ as of each month starting in January 1999) = imputed DM/US$ for each month in the sample period after the adoption of the Euro. 37 We perform several robustness checks of this specification: (1) utilizing an 80-month rolling window, reduced the number of observations to 168,520; (2) utilizing a 100-month rolling window, reduced the number of observations to 139,669. Although the results (available upon request) were very similar to those presented in the paper, the operational VaR measures tended to be slightly higher using the 80 and 100 month windows. Therefore, the results presented in the paper for operational value at risk can be considered conservative estimates. 38 Since information on macroeconomic and firm-specific variables are not released contemporaneously, we performed an additional robustness check on our model. We reconstituted the database matching CRSP and macroeconomic data with COMPUSTAT data one quarter later. The number of observations fell to 208,420, but there was no impact on our results (available upon request).
In the final sample, we have 217,158 observations with the number of firms in any month ranging from 70 to 1169. 39 A considerable portion of the raw returns for financial firms can be attributed to a return for operational risk exposure. On average, the ratio of residual (operational risk) to total equity returns is 17.7%, with considerable monthly variance. 40 This suggests that financial firms have considerable levels of residual operational risk exposure that has been left relatively unmanaged. This may be the result of the lag in the development of operational risk measurement models, as well as the less developed state of the catastrophic and operational risk derivatives market.
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In order to examine the distribution of operational risk across types of financial intermediaries, we measure operational risk for each of the three industry segments defined in Eq. (21). 42 The insurance industry absorbed the least amount of operational risk on average over the 1973-2003 period. The average monthly ratio of residual to total equity returns for insurance companies is 10.5% as compared to 19.4% for securities firms. In contrast, depository institutions have an average monthly ratio of residual to raw equity returns of 39.4%. This is consistent with moral hazard implications of the government safety net that may induce banks to take on additional risk exposures. In the next sections, we utilize both the GPD and the SGED distributions to examine the tails of our derived operational risk measures.
Estimating the operational risk parameters
We use the methodology presented in Section 2 to re-estimate the three GPD location, scale and tail thickness parameters (denoted l-ORGPD, r-ORGPD, and n-ORGPD, respectively) using the operational risk residuals and then use the methodology in Section 4 to define the GPD operational value at risk (VaR) at the 1% level, denoted VaR1%-ORGPD. Fig. 4A compares the 1% operational VaR measures using the GPD to the catastrophic 1% VaR measures using the GPD. The plot of the monthly VaR shows that, in a majority of months during the 1973-2003 sample period, the operational value at risk measures are lower (have lower loss levels) than the VaR measures obtained for catastrophic risk. Losses from operational risk events are less than the losses from catastrophic risk events (including all sources of risk) at all probability levels.
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Using the monthly residual operational risk measures, we re-estimate the SGED using the methodology described in Section 3 for operational risk, thereby generating four 39 We obtained qualitatively similar results when we performed a similar analysis by estimating Eq. (21) omitting the COMPUSTAT firm-specific measures of credit risk. For that analysis, we had a total of 355,586 (rather than 217,158) observations. 40 The range of the ratios is not necessarily between 0 and 1 if, for example, the raw return for a particular monthly equity return is very small or negative whereas the 22 risk variables imply a high positive return, then the residual will be a large negative number, resulting in a ratio with absolute value exceeding one. In computing the mean, we dropped the results for January 2002 and February 2002 (1692 observations) because of very low monthly average equity returns (driven by two outlier firms) that raised the ratio to unrealistically high levels for these two months. 41 For a discussion of operational risk measurement and management using derivatives, see Chapter 5 of . 42 As described in footnote 37, we dropped the outlier months of January 2002 and February 2002 from the computation of these average monthly ratios of the operational risk to total equity returns. 43 Similar results are obtained for 0.5%, 1%, 1.5%, 2%, and 2.5% catastrophic and operational VaR levels. A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date A p r -7 3 A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date parameter measures: mean, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness for operational risk (denoted l-ORSGED, r-ORSGED, n-ORSGED, and k-ORSGED, respectively). Using these parameter values, we then estimate the monthly operational 1% VaR (denoted VaR1%-ORSGED) and compare with the catastrophic 1% VaR (denoted VaR1%-SGED). Fig. 4B shows that the operational VaR measures are lower than the catastrophic VaR measures obtained using raw returns. This is consistent with the results shown in Fig. 4A using the GPD parameters to estimate VaR and is robust for several probability levels.
1% VaR of SGED
Figs. 5A and B show the ratios of the 1% operational VaR to the 1% catastrophic VaR obtained from the GPD and SGED distributions, respectively. The mean monthly ratio over the entire sample period is 0.52 for the GPD and 0.42 for the SGED distribution, and both ratios are significantly greater than zero and less than one, at the 1% level. Specifically, the t-statistics from testing the significance of the ratio of 1% operational VaR to the 1% catastrophic VaR are 41.92 and 63.59 for GPD and SGED estimates, respectively. The corresponding Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are 27.84 and 37.71, respectively. Thus, we conclude that operational risk loss levels are lower than overall catastrophic loss levels. Moreover, we examined the tail probabilities for various loss rates (ranging from returns of À1% p.a. to À50% p.a.) and found that the area under the lower tail of the operational risk distribution was higher than the area under the lower tail of the return distribution for extremely low returns (equity returns below À12%), thereby suggesting that operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of extremely large declines in returns than other risk events. Thus, operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of large unexpected catastrophic losses, although when they occur, the losses are smaller than those resulting from a combination of market risk, credit risk or other risk events.
As an estimate of the dollar magnitude of these losses, we compute average VaR levels for both operational risk and catastrophic risk exposures. On average for all financial institutions over the 1973-2003 sample period, the dollar VaR for catastrophic risk is $165 million using the GPD methodology and $156 million using the SGED approach. Operational VaR averaged $84 million and $65 million, for the GPD and SGED methodologies respectively, over the sample period. Breaking down the dollar VaR calculations by industry, we find that the insurance industry had the largest dollar exposure to both catastrophic and operational risk, on average over the sample period. That is, for insurance companies, the catastrophic dollar VaR averaged $267 ($254) million using the GPD (SGED) methodology, and the operational dollar VaR averaged $132 ($105) million using the GPD (SGED) methodology. In contrast, depository institutions had average catastrophic dollar VaR of $184 ($174) million using the GPD (SGED) methodology, and average operational dollar VaR of $93 ($72) million using the GPD (SGED) methodology. 44 Finally, securities firms had the smallest dollar exposure on average over the sample period. Catastrophic dollar VaR averaged $155 ($145) million using the GPD (SGED) methodology, whereas operational dollar VaR averaged $79 ($61) million using the GPD (SGED) methodology. A p r -7 4 A p r -7 5 A p r -7 6 A p r -7 7 A p r -7 8 A p r -7 9 A p r -8 0 A p r -8 1 A p r -8 2 A p r -8 3 A p r -8 4 A p r -8 5 A p r -8 6 A p r -8 7 A p r -8 8 A p r -8 9 A p r -9 0 A p r -9 1 A p r -9 2 A p r -9 3 A p r -9 4 A p r -9 5 A p r -9 6 A p r -9 7 A p r -9 8 A p r -9 9 A p r -0 0 A p r -0 1 A p r -0 2 A p r -0 3 date Ratio Results using both the GPD and the SGED methodologies suggest that financial intermediaries are exposed to considerable amounts of residual operational risk. Operational risk management presents extremely difficult risk control challenges when compared to the management of other sources of risk exposure, such as market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk. The internal nature of the exposure makes both measurement and management difficult. Young (1999, p. 10) states that ''open socio-technical systems have an infinite number of ways of failing . . . The complexity of human behavior prevents errors from being pre-specified and reduced to a simple numerical representation.'' Operational risk is embedded in a firm and cannot be easily separated out. Thus, even if a hedge performs as designed, the firm will be negatively affected in terms of damage to reputation or disruption of business as a result of a low frequency, high severity operational risk event.
Cyclicality in operational risk measures
In Section 6, we derive a residual measure of operational risk. In this section, we investigate the cyclical components of our operational risk measure. We examine the relationship between the operational risk measures and the cyclical factors presented in Table 1 , consisting of monthly data on macroeconomic, cyclical, systemic risk, and regulatory factors. We replicate the univariate analysis used for catastrophic risk, as outlined in Section 5.
45 Tables 4 and 5 present the correlation coefficients for all 43 macroeconomic variables using all seven of the GPD and SGED operational risk parameters, as well as the operational value at risk measures VaR1%-ORGPD and VaR1%-ORSGED.
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 again display considerable consistency across the GPD and SGED methodologies. Correlation coefficients are similar in size, sign and statistical significance. There is also evidence of procyclicality in the operational value at risk measures, as evidenced by the high level of statistical significance for the correlations between the macroeconomic variables and the VaR measures shown in Table 4 (for GPD estimates) and Table 5 (for SGED estimates). For example, the correlation coefficients on the index of US industrial production and US GDP are positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) for both the VaR1%-ORGPD (0.35 and 0.42 for IndustryIndex and GDP_US, respectively, in Table 4 using the GPD methodology) and for the VaR1%-ORSGED (0.36 and 0.44, in Table 5 using the SGED methodology). The correlation coefficients on all country stock price indices are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with the results obtained in Tables 2 and 3 for catastrophic risk. All interest rate variables are negatively correlated with operational VaR and all money supply variables are positively correlated with operational VaR (most correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level). This suggests that operational value at risk declines during the periods of a relatively tight monetary policy consistent with an overheated economy. Similarly, during periods of an easy monetary policy (when interest rates are low and money supply figures are high), generally coincident with economic downturns, the operational value at risk (VaR1%-ORGPD and VaR1%-ORSGED) increases.
The regulatory environment also impacts operational value at risk. As for catastrophic value at risk, the correlation coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with significant (at the 1% level) increases in operational value at risk following the passage of the DID-MCA of 1980, the FDICIA of 1991 and the GLBA of 1999. In addition, operational VaR increased upon passage of the Interstate Banking Act in 1994 and the Basel Accords in 1992 (positive correlation coefficients significant at the 10% or better).
Robustness checks

Cyclicality in conditional VaR measures
The time-series variation in the moments of the empirical return distribution implies that the actual catastrophic risk measures can vary through time. Therefore, we propose a conditional VaR approach to investigate the presence and significance of cyclicality in the conditional catastrophic risk measures. Specifically, we use an MA(1) GARCH-inmean process with the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) to model the dynamic behavior of stock returns. The model is as follows:
where r t is the return assumed to follow the SGED density, l tjtÀ1 is the conditional mean and r 2 tjtÀ1 is the conditional variance of returns based on the information set up to time t À 1, X tÀ1 . r 2 tjtÀ1 in Eq. (23) is originally proposed by Glosten et al. (1993) and known as the GJR-GARCH model. It indicates an asymmetric volatility response to the last period's unexpected news and the last period's variance. 46 Since b 3 > 0, negative information shocks will have a greater impact on volatility than positive shocks of the same magnitude. The conditional mean l tjtÀ1 in Eq. (22) is a function of the past returns and the current conditional volatility. e t = r t z t is the residual process, where z t = (r t À l tjtÀ1 )/r tjtÀ1 is a series of identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) standardized returns. Note that because of the i.i.d. assumption, the standardized returns have the same conditional and unconditional probability density function (p.d.f.), i.e., f(z t jX tÀ1 ) = f(z t ). On the other hand, the returns r t have a conditional p.d.f. that depends directly on their conditional means and conditional standard deviations. Consequently, computed VaR thresholds for returns also depend on the conditional mean and conditional standard deviation of returns, and as such they are time-varying.
The conditional VaR for r t at a given coverage probability a, denoted by # tjtÀ1 , is obtained from the solution of the following cumulative distribution of returns:
46 Following the introduction of ARCH models by Engle (1982) and their generalization (GARCH) by Bollerslev (1986) , there have been numerous refinements of this approach to estimating conditional volatility. Most of the refinements have been driven by empirical regularities in financial data. Asymmetry (or asymmetric volatility response to past information shocks) seems to be responsible for the plethora of extant GARCH models. Following Black's (1976) exploration of this phenomenon, it is now commonly referred to as the leverage effect: changes in stock prices tend to be negatively related to changes in volatility. The GJR-GARCH model of Glosten et al. (1993) is one of the most popular asymmetric GARCH models used in the existing literature.
where f(r t jX tÀ1 ) is the conditional p.d.f. for returns. Note that the above probability function can be written in terms of the standardized returns in the following equivalent form:
where the p.d.f. for the standardized returns f(z t ) and the threshold a associated with the coverage probability a do not depend on time or the information set X tÀ1 . The latter is a byproduct of the assumption that the series of standardized returns is i.i.d. Given the estimated threshold a for the standardized returns, the conditional (time-varying) VaR for the returns can be computed using the transformation
where the conditional mean, l tjtÀ1 , and the conditional volatility of returns, r tjtÀ1 , are computed using Eqs. (22) and (23). We test cyclicality in the conditional catastrophic risk measures of major financial institutions. 47 First, we generate the value-weighted portfolio returns for major, recognizable financial institutions, and for each of the three industry sectors (depository institutions, insurance companies, and securities firms).
48 Second, we use the value-weighted portfolio returns to estimate the MA(1) SGED-GJRGARCH-in-mean model given in Eqs. (22) and (23) for the entire financial industry and for each of the three sub-groups. Finally, based on the maximum likelihood parameter estimates we compute the conditional 1% VaR using Eq. (26). 49 A notable point in Fig. 6A is that the conditional 1% VaR of depository institutions is higher than the 1% VaR of insurance companies and securities firms, as in our results for unconditional catastrophic VaR. However, the insurance companies have higher VaR levels than the depository institutions during a few months, most notably shown as huge spikes in VaR for insurance companies during the last quarter of 1974 and the second quarter of 2000. Over the sample period of 1973-2003, the unconditional mean of the conditional 1% VaR measures is equal to 14.70% for the whole industry, 18.39% for depository institutions, 15.01% for securities firms, and 14.31% for insurance companies. The sample standard deviation of the conditional 1% VaR measures is equal to 1.99% for the whole industry, 1.87% for depository institutions, 2.12% for securities firms, and 3.71% for insurance companies.
To check the presence and significance of cyclicality in the conditional catastrophic risk measures, we calculate the correlation coefficients between the conditional 1% VaR measures and the 43 macroeconomic variables. Based on the p-values, there are 22 (out of 43) correlations that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level or better for the entire 47 Appendix A lists major financial institutions used in our analysis of the conditional value at risk. 48 The industry segment groupings were done by SIC code, such that depository institutions included SIC codes 60XX, 66XX and 6712; insurance companies included SIC codes 63XX and 64XX; and securities firms included all other 6XXX-level SIC codes. 49 Since we do not use the COMPUSTAT data when calculating conditional VaR measures, we do not lose any observations and thus the results are based on the entire sample period of January 1973 -December 2003 industry. Better results are obtained for the three sub-groups. Specifically, we have 30, 28, and 27 statistically significant correlation coefficients for the depository institutions, securities firms, and insurance company sub-samples, respectively.
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In addition to the conditional catastrophic risk measures, we investigate the cyclicality in the conditional operational risk measures. Using a similar version of Eq. (21), we generate the time-series of residuals for major, recognizable institutions and for each of the three industry sectors. More specifically, we regress the value-weighted portfolio returns on the first differences of macroeconomic risk variables, three FamaFrench (1993) factors, and the momentum factor in order to generate the time-series of residuals for the whole industry and three sub-groups. Then, we use the residual series to estimate the MA(1) SGED-GJRGARCH-in-mean model given in Eqs. (22) and (23) for the entire financial industry and for each of the three sub-groups. Finally, based on the maximum likelihood parameter estimates we compute the conditional operational 1% VaR. Fig. 6A , the conditional operational 1% VaR of depository institutions is generally higher than the 1% operational VaR of insurance companies and securities firms. However, the insurance companies have higher operational VaR levels than the depository institutions during the late 1970s and early 1980s, most notably shown as huge spikes in VaR for insurance companies during the period of 1977-1979 and 2000-2001. Over the period of 1973-2003, the sample mean of the conditional operational 1% VaR measures is equal to 4.54% for the whole industry, 7.61% for depository institutions, 3.23% for securities firms, and 7.37% for insurance companies. The standard deviation of the 1% operational VaR measures is equal to 1.62% for the whole industry, 0.68% for depository institutions, 0.89% for securities firms, and 2.04% for insurance companies.
We calculate the ratio of the conditional operational 1% VaR to the conditional catastrophic 1% VaR measures for the whole industry and three sub-groups. Similar to our findings from the unconditional VaR measures, the average ratio over the sample period of 1973-2003 is about 0.31 for the whole industry, 0.40 for depository institutions, 0.21 for securities firms, and 0.55 for insurance companies.
To test for the presence and significance of cyclicality in the conditional operational VaR measures, we compute the correlations between the conditional operational 1% VaR measures and the 43 macroeconomic variables. Based on the p-values, there are 38 (out of 43) correlations that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level or better for the entire industry. The results are almost the same for the three sub-groups. Specifically, we have 27, 33, and 41 statistically significant correlation coefficients for the depository institutions, securities firms, and insurance companies, respectively.
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Overall, the results provide strong evidence that our main findings on cyclicality are robust across unconditional and conditional measures of catastrophic and operational risk.
Alternative distribution functions
As discussed earlier, there is substantial empirical evidence that the distribution of stock returns is skewed, fat tailed and shows high peaks. To account for skewness and kurtosis in the data, earlier studies used symmetric fat-tailed or skewed fat-tailed distributions to model the unconditional or conditional distribution of financial returns. One distribution that is used extensively and can accommodate thick tails is the Student t distribution. Two other distributions that have been used for leptokurtic data are the generalized error distribution (GED), which is also referred to as the power exponential distribution, and the generalized t (GT) distribution. The GED was originally introduced by Subbotin (1923) and then used by Box and Tiao (1962) , Nelson (1991) , and Hsieh (1989) among others. The GED includes the Normal and the Laplace as special cases. McDonald and Newey (1988) introduced the generalized t (GT) distribution, which is symmetric about its mean and generalizes both the Student t and GED distributions.
Although the Student t, GED, and GT distributions allow for considerable flexibility for the values of kurtosis, they cannot model skewness which is observed in many economic time series. Five flexible parameter distributions which can model both skewed and thick-tailed empirical distributions are the skewed t distribution of Hansen (1994) , the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) of Bali and Theodossiou (forthcoming) , the skewed generalized t (SGT) distribution of Theodossiou (1998) , the exponential generalized beta of the second kind (EGB2) distribution of McDonald and Xu (1995) , and the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) distribution of Johnson (1949) . 52 Bali and Theodossiou (2004) test the empirical performance of the aforementioned distributions and find that the skewed generalized t (SGT) and the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) provide a very accurate characterization of stock market returns. They indicate that the SGT and SGED distributions model the tails of the empirical distribution better than the Student t, GED, GT, skewed t, EGB2, IHS, Laplace, and Normal distributions.
53 Following Bali and Theodossiou (2004) , we use the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED) to estimate the catastrophic and operational risk measures. However, to check the robustness of our findings, we also use the skewed generalized t distribution, which nests many well-known symmetric and asymmetric fat-tailed distributions.
The skewed generalized t (SGT) probability density function is SGTðr; l; r; n; k; kÞ ¼ C r 1 þ jej
where C = k/(2((n À 2)/k) 1/k hB(1/k, n/k)), h = (k/(n À 2)) 1/k B(1/k, n/k) 0.5 B(3/k, (n À 2)/ k) À0.5 S(k) À1 , SðkÞ ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi 1 þ 3k 2 À 4A 2 k 2 p , A = B(2/k, (n À 1)/k)B(1/k, n/k) À0.5 B(3/k, (n À 2)/ k) À0.5 , d = 2kAS(k) À1 , l and r are the mean and standard deviation of r; n and k are kurtosis parameters; k is a skewness parameter obeying the constraint jkj < 1, sign is the sign 52 The interested reader may wish to consult Bali and Theodossiou (2004) function, B(AE) is the beta function and e = r À l + dr. In the above density, l À dr is the mode and d = (l À mode(y))/r is Pearson's skewness. The SGT nests several well-known distributions. Specifically, it gives for k = 0 the generalized-t of McDonald and Newey (1988) ; for k = 2 the skewed t of Hansen (1994) ; for n = 1 the skewed generalized error distribution of Bali and Theodossiou (forthcoming); for n = 1 and k = 0 the generalized error distribution or power exponential distribution of Subbotin (1923) ; for k = 2 and k = 0 the Student t distribution; for n = 1, k = 0 and k = 1 the Laplace or double exponential distribution; for n = 1, k = 0 and k = 2 the Normal distribution; and for n = 1, k = 0 and k = 1 the Uniform distribution.
As shown in Fig. 7 , the time-series pattern of the 1% catastrophic and operational VaR measures obtained from the GPD, SGED, and SGT distributions are all very similar over the sample period of April 1973-June 2003. The only difference is that the catastrophic and operational VaR measures of SGT are smaller than those of the GPD and SGED. However, we calculate the ratio of 1% operational VaR to the 1% catastrophic VaR obtained for the SGT and the mean monthly ratio is found to be 0.61, which is close to those obtained from the GPD and SGED distributions.
We also check the presence and significance of cyclicality in the catastrophic and operational risk measures of SGT by calculating the correlations between the 1% VaR measures and 43 macroeconomic variables. Table 6 shows that for the catastrophic VaR estimates there are 29 (out of 43) correlations that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level, and 22 of them are significant at least at the 1% level. Similar to our findings from the GPD and SGED, for the operational VaR estimates, we have 38 (out of 43) correlations that are statistically significant at least at the 10% level, with 30 correlations significant at the 1% level. Most importantly, the size and sign of the correlation coefficients in Table 6 are quite similar to those obtained using the GPD and SGED, presented in Tables 2 and 3 for catastrophic risk and Tables 4 and 5 for operational risk. These results indicate that our main findings on cyclicality are robust across alternative distribution functions.
Conclusion
We examine the catastrophic risk of financial institutions and test for procyclicality. We utilize an extreme value approach (generalized Pareto distribution, GPD), as well as a generalized distributional approach (skewed generalized error distribution, SGED) to obtain estimates of catastrophic risk parameters and 1% value at risk (VaR). We find evidence of procyclicality in the catastrophic VaR for financial institutions.
We define a new, residual operational risk measure and estimate the risk parameters using both the GPD and SGED. We use these operational risk parameters to determine the 1% operational VaR. Using our measure, we find that operational risk is quite significant, comprising approximately 18% of the total equity returns of financial institutions. This paper presents the first evidence of procyclicality in operational risk measures.
Results are consistent across methodologies for both catastrophic and operational risk measures. Our results are robust to alternative distributional specifications, conditionality in the VaR, and simulated databases. Thus, we conclude that macroeconomic, systematic and environmental factors play a considerable role in influencing the risk of financial institutions. Models that ignore these factors are therefore fundamentally flawed. These results provide encouragement for further research into both catastrophic and operational risk measures that are conditioned on cyclical factors.
